The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry:  Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility by Uriz, Genoveva Hernandez
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 2
2002
The Application of the World Bank Standards to
the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group
Promote Corporate Responsibility
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote
Corporate Responsibility, 28 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol28/iss1/2
File: Uriz Base  Macro  final.doc Created on: 11/2/2002 6:56 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM 
THE APPLICATION OF THE WORLD 
BANK STANDARDS TO THE OIL 
INDUSTRY: CAN THE WORLD BANK 
GROUP PROMOTE CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY? 
Genoveva Hernández Uriz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UMAN rights activists have turned their attention to 
international financial institutions (“IFIs”), because they 
have acquired more leverage in the international archi-
tecture than the traditional United Nations (“UN”)-based 
mechanisms.1  The World Bank Group (“World Bank” or 
“Bank”) has become the world’s main developmental institution.  
The International Development Association (“IDA”), the soft-
loan window of the World Bank, has attracted more resources 
on its own than the entire UN system.2  The World Bank re-
sources quadruple those of the UN when one adds the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“IBRD”).3  
The World Bank, through its private sector arms — the Inter-
national Financial Corporation (“IFC”) and the Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) — lends and provides 
insurance, respectively, to companies willing to invest in devel-
oping countries.4  Given its vocation as an investment promoter, 
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College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium), 1995; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1999.  
Many thanks to Professor Philip Alston and Harvey Van Veldhuizen for their 
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 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001, 
xviii–xix (2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/intro/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
 2. HELGE OLE BERGESEN & LEIV LUNDE, DINOSAURS OR DYNAMOS?: THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE WORLD BANK AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 161–62, 
198, 213 (1999). 
 3. Id. at 161. 
 4. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, Dec. 5, 
1955, art. 1, 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117 (amended Apr. 28, 1993) [here-
inafter IFC Articles of Agreement]. 
H 
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one may wonder what the World Bank’s role is in the estab-
lishment of corporate responsibility standards. 
Among the different corporate activities subject to public 
scrutiny, the oil sector has one of the worst human rights repu-
tations.  Oil companies have been accused of supporting dictato-
rial regimes, using repressive armed forces to their own benefit, 
and externalizing the costs of the oil production on host com-
munities that seldom receive a fair share of the benefits.5  How-
ever, in the last few years, corporate discourse has experienced 
an unprecedented shift.  Companies now seem to be aware that 
the traditional “mind your own business” stance cannot be pub-
licly maintained without suffering adverse marketing conse-
quences.6  At least nominally, oil transnationals acknowledge 
that the criteria for success are broader than in the past.7  Ma-
jor corporations are eager to declare that corporate responsibil-
ity builds shareholder value.8  For better or for worse, codes of 
conduct have been adopted in an attempt to respond to the 
mounting pressures on corporations to acknowledge, measure, 
and disclose their broader social responsibilities.  The response 
is very patchy due to the lack of a legal framework on compa-
nies’ duties and the lack of enforcement mechanisms, other 
than public pressure, and, occasionally, the threat of sanctions 
by host governments.9 
  
 5. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbjorn Eide et al. 
eds., 2000). 
 6. See, e.g., SHELL INTE RNATIONAL LIMITED, THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE: 
SHELL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at http://www.shell.com/ 
home/media-en/downloads/publications/there_is_no_alternative_12072002.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2002). 
 7. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies, Contributing to Sustain-
able Development: A Management Primer, available at www.oikos.-
stgallen.org/international/shellprimer.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2002).  John 
Elkinton argues that in the twenty-first century, successful business will need 
to take into account a “triple bottom line” consisting in economic performance, 
environmental sustainability and social justice.  John Elkington, The Triple 
Bottom Line for Twenty-First Century Business, in COMPANIES IN A WORLD OF 
CONFLICT: NGOS, SANCTIONS AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 32, 32 (John 
Mitchell ed., 1998). 
 8. Chevron Texaco, Social Responsibility, at http://www.chevrontexaco. 
com/social_responsibility/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2002). 
 9. As one commentator points out, “one could easily write a book describ-
ing the vast variety of codes that are being advocated by groups of all persua-
sions.”  However: 
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This paper will argue that a closer look at the World Bank’s 
Operational Policies (“OPs”) may be helpful in setting minimum 
benchmarks in oil exploitation projects.  First, the question is 
particularly pertinent with regard to the oil market, because 
the World Bank has broad experience in financing expansive 
infrastructure and natural  resource projects.10  The areas in 
which the World Bank has developed guidelines tackle issues 
where oil investments are likely to cause problems, such as in-
digenous peoples, involuntary resettlement, and the environ-
ment.11  Moreover, the World Bank claims to have assumed the 
risk of ensuring that large oil exploitation projects become a 
vehicle for welfare.12  More oil developments are to be expected 
in the future, as the World Bank has stated that the financing 
of petroleum projects is “of the highest priority for Bank Group 
support.”13   
This field of investment, however, is a controversial one.  
Proof of this is the launching of the Extractive Industries Review 
  
one would be hard pressed to write more than a few pages if one were 
to report the research evidence of the effectiveness of these codes, as 
to intended outcomes, verification of claims, made . . . and above all, 
evidence of their sustained relevance and viability under various cul-
tural and political frameworks, economic and competitive industry 
conditions and institutional organisational constraints.   
S. Prakash Sethi, Gaps in Research in the Formulation, Implementation and 
Effectiveness Measurement of International Codes of Conduct, in GLOBAL 
CODES OF CONDUCT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 117, 119 (Oliver F. Wil-
liams ed., 2000). 
 10. BERGESEN & LUNDE, supra note 2, at 110–111.  In fact, during its early 
years, the Bank concentrated on infrastructure projects. 
 11. See generally The World Bank, World Bank Operational Manual, at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter World Bank Operational Manual]. 
 12. The World Bank, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project, Questions and Answers, Why is the Bank Group Involved?, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/questions/index.htm (last updated Aug. 
15, 2002) [hereinafter Questions and Answers]. 
 13. See Project Appraisal Document on Proposed International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Loans to the Tchad Oil Transportation Com-
pany, S.A. and Cameroon Oil Transportation Company, S.A. for a Petroleum 
Development and Pipeline Project, The World Bank Report No. 19343 AFR, 
Apr. 13, 2000, at 20, available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/10/21/0000949
46_00102111244720/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf [hereinafter Project Ap-
praisal Document]. 
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(“The Review”) by the World Bank in 2001.  The Review seeks 
to open a consultation process with governments, industries, 
non-government organizations (“NGOs”) and academics in order 
to ascertain what role the World Bank might play with regard 
to delicate questions such as environmental and social sustain-
ability, revenue sharing, human rights protection, and the ef-
fects of extractive industries on host communities.14 
In all likelihood, the World Bank’s experience and leverage 
may be relevant to the promotion of corporate responsibility 
because it incorporates project guidelines into contractual 
documents, and therefore makes them legally binding on bor-
rowers.15  The furtherance of corporate responsibility through 
contractual mechanisms should be the subject of study at a 
moment in which the voluntary approach taken by internation-
ally developed codes of conduct, such as the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the In-
ternational Labor Organization (“ILO”) guidelines, has been 
considered unsatisfactory.16 
Even when the World Bank is not sponsoring a project, it may 
still act as a trendsetter.  The World Bank’s technical assistance 
may encourage states to adopt the Bank’s OP as internal meas-
ures, even in projects the Bank is not involved in.17  By the 
same token, in an environment of growing demands upon pri-
  
 14. Extractive Industries Review, What exactly is this Review? (Frequently 
Asked Questions), at http://www.eireview.org/eir/eirhome.nsf/EnglishOther 
Links/faq?opendocument (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
 15. The World Bank Operational Guidelines contain express references to 
the incorporation of the Operational Directives and Policies in the loan docu-
ments.  See World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 11; World Bank Op-
erational Manual, Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples ¶ 20 (Sept. 
1991), [hereinafter World Bank OD]; World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Reset-
tlement ¶ 30 (June 1990) (according to which the borrower’s obligation to 
carry out the Resettlement Plan is enshrined in a legally binding document); 
World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policy 4.01: Environmental 
Assessment (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter World Bank OP].   
 16. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Rights Codes for Transnational 
Corporations: The Sullivan and McBride Principles, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE : THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM 418, 419 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (describing internationally devel-
oped codes of conduct as failures). 
 17. Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International Institutions 
as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, 
in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 
323, 323 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999). 
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vate investors, the steps taken by multilateral lenders may pro-
vide states with guidelines about what standards they should 
apply to be on the “safe side.”  However, in order for this influ-
ence to be useful in practice, the World Bank’s financing needs 
to be attractive to investors.  Abundant literature exists regard-
ing the World Bank’s leverage upon borrowing states.18  As to 
private investment, economists have mixed opinions on whether 
the Bank really catalyses private investment flow.19  Although 
the World Bank’s role as “norm generator” may be highly 
dependent on its economic success as an investment catalyst, 
the two are not entirely co-dependent.  The OPs’ application 
may also be significant because other development banks 
already follow this trend.  In addition, other financing agencies 
often want the Bank’s imprimatur because it is a demanding 
lender with external credibility.20 
Although public attention towards the relations between cor-
porations and international financial institutions (“IFIs”) has 
increased in the last few years, investors’ interest in IFIs is not 
a recent phenomenon.  In the 1970s, oil companies had already 
declared that they valued IFI involvement in foreign exploita-
tion ventures, not only for the contributions they made, but also 
because of their stabilizing role, which could help to ease ten-
sion in the company-host government relations.21  In addition to 
this conciliating role, the World Bank’s involvement in oil ex-
ploitation ventures in the 1990s may have become a crucial fac-
tor in the marketing strategy of companies willing to avoid hu-
man rights scandals.22 
It would be naive to ignore the difficulties and constraints 
that the World Bank faces in the development of a genuine cor-
porate responsibility policy vis-à-vis its clients.  So far, the 
  
 18. See, e.g., BIPLAB DASGUPTA, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, GLOBAL TRADE 
AND THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT (1998).  See also Jonathan 
Cahn, Challenging the New Imperial Authority: The World Bank and the De-
mocratization of Development, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 159 (1993). 
 19. See generally Graham Bird et al., Do the Multilaterals Catalyse Other 
Capital Flows?, A Case Study Analysis, 21 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 483 
(2000).  See also DANI RODRIK, WHY IS THERE MULTILATERAL LENDING? (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5160, 1995). 
 20. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 336. 
 21. KAMAL HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT : 
CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONALS AND GOVERNMENTS 70 (1979). 
 22. Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 22. 
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World Bank’s ideology has led it to promote legal regimes in 
which investors’ rights took pre-eminence over their obliga-
tions.23  Moreover, the World Bank’s own institutional interests 
may render toothless the application of a corporate responsibil-
ity policy, as there may be a practical contradiction between the 
roles of banker/investor and standard setter/monitor.24  This 
conflict is especially acute in investments in which the IFC it-
self acquires a stake in the project.25  However, these difficulties 
do not represent a theoretical impediment for the reinforcement 
of the World Bank’s social and environmental guidelines, as it 
will be argued below. 
Commentators have stressed that the World Bank is failing 
because of its broadening mandate.26  They argue that the 
World Bank has taken over many areas that were previously 
within the UN’s domain, and has at the same time lost its main 
asset — its expertise in a discrete number of issues.27  One of 
the suggested avenues for change is a return to traditional pro-
ject IBRD loans and an emphasis on the role of the MIGA and 
IFC.28   
This paper will study the standards imposed by the World 
Bank’s policies and explore its capacity to act, not only as a re-
sponsible investor, but also as a trendsetter in the petroleum 
sector.  Section II will analyze the substantive and procedural 
benchmarks imposed by the World Bank’s policies.  Section III 
will focus on the most important example in which these 
  
 23. For a critique of the World Bank’s Policies on these grounds, see An-
thony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Fi-
nancial Institutions and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT ’L L. & POL. 243, 253 
(2000); Cahn, supra note 18, at 169; KEVIN DANAHER, 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH : THE 
CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND  
(1994); DASGUPTA, supra note 18, at 87. 
 24. In this respect, Ibrahim Shihata, the Bank’s former General Counsel, 
argued that a proactive democracy and human rights policy would lead to the 
politization of the Bank and its loss of credibility in the financial markets.  See 
Ibrahim Shihata, Democracy and Development, 46 INT ’L & COMP. L. Q. 635, 
642 (1997). 
 25. The IFC also carries out equity investments; it purchases a stake in a 
project which it eventually sells off later.  See IFC, IFC Financial Products, at 
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/basics/basics.html (last visited Jan. 25, 
2002). 
 26. BERGESEN & LUNDE, supra note 2, at 134–40. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. at 139. 
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benchmarks have been applied in practice — the 
Chad/Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project 
(“Chad/Cameroon Project” or “Project”).  One of the main objec-
tions made to a greater involvement of the IBRD in the human 
rights situation of borrowing countries is its dramatic 
North/South dimension.29  In other words, it is not very reassur-
ing that a powerful institution dominated by a small number of 
countries, that has already intervened widely in its clients’ af-
fairs (many times to the detriment of human rights), will use its 
power to impose human rights norms.  Nevertheless, a properly 
reinforced application of the World Bank’s standards to its cli-
ents in the private sector does not give rise to North/South fair-
ness questions.  With this idea in mind, Section IV will explore 
the possibility of reinforcing the social and environmental poli-
cies of the World Bank’s private sector branches, the IFC and 
the MIGA. 
II. THE WORLD BANK’S OPERATIONAL STANDARDS. 
Originally, the Bank’s operational standards were conceived 
as aspirational targets.30  Over time, the standards have in-
creasingly acquired a mandatory status.31  The standards did 
not originate through a thought-out legislative process, but, 
rather, were created on an ad hoc basis, as problems arose with 
particular projects.32  The first standards were adopted in the 
1970s.33  After 1987, these original standards began to be con-
solidated into Operational Directives (“ODs”), which included 
  
 29. The number of votes in the Bank’s Board of Governors corresponds to 
the number of shares that a country has subscribed to.  The largest share-
holders are the U.S. (16% of the votes), Japan (7.87%), and Germany (4.49%).  
Since the most developed countries do not take loans from the Bank, the sys-
tem is one in which the countries having more weight on the decisions never 
have to bear their consequences.  See The World Bank, IBRD: Votes and Sub-
scriptions, at http://www.worldbank.org [retrieve chart from the following 
path: “Home” > “About Us” >“Organization” > “Executive Boards” > “IBRD: 
Votes and Subscriptions”] (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). 
 30. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Policy Guidance and Compliance: 
The World Bank Operational Standards, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE : 
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDNG NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 281, 
283 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
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elements of policy, procedure, and guidance.34  During the last 
few years, the World Bank has converted the Operational Di-
rectives into different norms called Operational Policies, Bank 
Procedures (“BPs”), and Good Practices.  The invoked rationale 
for this conversion is to increase clarity for the staff, the Inspec-
tion Panel, and the affected parties.35   
The application of the Bank’s operational standards is 
fraught with a series of difficulties.  First, the standards do not 
use normative language but are framed as a set of practical in-
structions to be followed in particular situations.  Second, not 
all the standards have the same normative value.  Realistically 
speaking, only the Operational Policies, Bank Procedures, and 
certain aspects of the Operational Directives are binding on the 
Bank’s staff, while Good Practices serve merely as recommen-
dations.36  Finally, not all of the institutions in the World Bank 
apply exactly the same rules, although the IBRD’s set of policies 
are the most highly developed.37  Therefore, IFC and MIGA 
  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The Bank’s OPs are defined as covering: 
matters of importance to the Bank’s core objectives and provide Bank 
staff direction and guidance in pursuit of those objectives.  OPs are 
short, focused statements that follow from the Bank’s Articles of 
Agreement, the general conditions and policies approved by the 
Board. They establish the parameters for the conduct of operations, 
and also describe the circumstances under which exceptions to policy 
are admissible and clarify who authorises such exceptions.   
Bank Procedures (“BPs”) explain how the Bank’s staff carries out the OPs, by 
describing the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bank wide 
consistency and quality.  World Bank Operational Manual, Definitions, supra 
note 15, at ¶¶ 3–5. 
  Only the violation of a binding policy triggers the jurisdiction of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel.  See IBRD Resolution No. 93–10, IDA Resolu-
tion No. 93–6, The World Bank Inspection Panel, Sept. 22, 1993 [hereinafter 
IBRD/IDA Resolution] and Conclusions of the Board’s Second Review of the 
Inspection Panel (Apr. 20, 1999), at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf/WResolution?openview&count=
500000 (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
 37. IFC and MIGA have developed their own policies although they apply 
IBRD’s policies when they do not have their own specific safeguard policies.  
The World Bank Operational Manual list of specific policies is much more 
extensive than that of the IFC and MIGA.  Compare IFC, Safeguard Policies, 
at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/Safeguard/safeguard.htm [hereinafter IFC 
Safeguard Policies], and MIGA, Disclosure Policies, at 
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policies are inspired by the IBRD and apply an IBRD policy 
when they do not have their own specific policy.38 
The World Bank Operations Manual contains a broad set of 
policies that are applicable to technical, environmental, social 
and cultural issues.39  The policies on “Environmental Assess-
ment,” “Indigenous Peoples,” and “Involuntary Resettlement” 
have been considered pillar policies.40  It is worth undertaking a 
more detailed analysis of these policies because they are also 
the most relevant to human rights issues that are likely to ap-
pear in oil exploitation projects, i.e. environmental degradation, 
displacement of peoples, and the collision, in some cases, with 
the rights of indigenous communities.  The three policies im-
pose both substantive requirements, such as minimum bench-
marks relating to the quality of the project, and procedural ob-
ligations on borrowers.41 
In the substantive aspects, according to the OP on Environ-
mental Assessment, projects financed by the Bank have to be 
environmentally sound and sustainable.42  In terms of project 
quality, this means that preventive and mitigative measures 
should take into account all aspects of the  environment, such as 
water, air, and land.43  The OP establishes a higher benchmark 
than mere respect for local legislation, as the World Bank also 
undertakes not to finance projects that could potentially contra-
vene a country’s treaty obligations.44  This policy provides an 
added value if the borrower is in a situation of non-compliance 
with its international obligations.  Moreover, the World Bank’s 
policies require a project to include components that strengthen 
  
http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/policies.htm, with World Bank Opera-
tional Manual, supra note 15. 
 38. See IFC, Environmental and Social Review Procedure, Introduction, at 
http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/ESRP/esrp.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) 
[hereinafter IFC Environmental & Social Review]; MIGA, Environmental and 
Social Review Procedures, at http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose 
/soc_rev.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002) [hereinafter MIGA Environmental & 
Social Review]. 
 39. See World Bank Operational Manual , supra note 15. 
 40. See Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 30, at 289. 
 41. See text accompanying notes 42–80. 
 42. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, supra note 15, ¶ 1.  
The same requirement is found in IFC and MIGA’s policies. 
 43. Id. ¶ 2. 
 44. Id. ¶ 3. 
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a borrower’s environmental capacity, both legal and institu-
tional, when it is weak.45 
A project must also comply with the Pollution Prevention and 
Abatement Handbook, which lays down pollution prevention 
and abatement measures and the World Bank’s emission level 
requirements.46  The OP, however, contains a relatively open-
ended exception, providing management with a wide discre-
tionary power.  After taking into account a borrower country’s 
legislation and local conditions, the Environmental Assessment 
may recommend alternative emission levels and pollution pre-
vention measures.47  However, it is the World Bank that ulti-
mately decides on the adequate level of justification.48 
The nature of procedural guarantees depend on project classi-
fication.  Projects receiving World Bank financing can be classi-
fied as Category A, B, or C, depending on their impact.49  Cate-
gory A projects are those having a sensitive, diverse, or un-
precedented environmental impact and requiring a full envi-
ronmental assessment.50  Major oil development projects are 
generally Category A, although the OP does not define the word 
“major.”51  Normally, projects affecting indigenous people or 
causing involuntary resettlement are also Category A projects.52  
An environmental assessment of a Category A project requires 
an analysis of the feasible alternatives (including the “without 
project” one).53  Category A projects’ environmental assessments 
also entail extensive consultation and disclosure requirements, 
which should be initiated as soon as possible.54  Furthermore, 
the borrower should report to the World Bank on its compliance 
with environmental measures, including: an environmental 
  
 45. Id. ¶ 14. 
 46. Id. ¶ 6.  The same requirement is found in IFC and MIGA’s policies. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. ¶ 7. 
 49. Id. ¶ 8. 
 50. Id. ¶ 8(a).  IFC and MIGA’s policies contain the same requirement.  
 51. See IFC, Environmental and Social Review Procedures, Annex B: Pro-
ject Categorization Examples, at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/enviro/Review_ 
Procedure_Main/Review_Procedure/Annex_B/annex_b.htm (last visited Oct. 
12, 2002) [hereinafter IFC Project Categorization Examples]. 
 52. Id. 
 53. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, supra note 15, ¶ 
8(a). 
 54. Id. ¶ 15. 
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management plan, mitigation, and monitoring measures.55  
There are fewer consultation requirements in Category B pro-
jects and none for those in Category C.  Consequently, the pro-
ject classification greatly impacts the affected populations’ hu-
man rights. 
The recently adopted OP on Involuntary Resettlement56 di-
rects the World Bank to try to avoid displacement, and if dis-
placement is unavoidable, to fully compensate the displaced 
persons and to assist them in their efforts to improve their liv-
ing standards or, at least, “to restore them.”57  This policy estab-
lishes a number of rules on compensation in order to ensure 
that resettled populations receive prompt and effective compen-
sation at the full replacement cost of their assets.58  It also re-
fers to the need of granting preference to land compensation 
over cash compensation, especially in cases where the commu-
nity livelihood is land-based.59  In some cases, these require-
ments may go beyond what local laws have established.  This 
OP also requires that resettlement plans pay special attention 
to the needs of vulnerable groups — those living below the pov-
erty line; those who are landless; the elderly, women, and chil-
dren; and the indigenous peoples or displaced persons whose 
rights are not yet recognized by local law.60 
In addition to compensation obligations, the OP states that 
adequate public services and infrastructure development should 
be provided to new communities.  This requirement is based on 
the idea that conditions and services in host communities 
should improve or, at least, not deteriorate.61  Where it is neces-
sary to minimize the negative effects of displacement, resettle-
ment plans should include measures to ensure that the dis-
placed persons are provided with development assistance, such 
as credit facilities or job opportunities.62 
  
 55. Id. ¶ 20. 
 56. In December 2001, the World Bank adopted OP and BP 4.12, replacing 
OD 4.30 on Involuntary Resettlement.  World Bank Operational Manual, su-
pra note 11. 
 57. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, supra note 15, ¶¶ 2(a), 
(c). 
 58. Id. ¶ 6(a)(3). 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 9–12. 
 60. Id. ¶ 8. 
 61. Id. ¶ 13(b). 
 62. Id. ¶ 6(c)(iii). 
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During the resettlement process, the borrower must put in 
place mechanisms permitting that both the displaced and the 
host communities are consulted on resettlement options and 
participate throughout the process, including monitoring.63  
Apart from guaranteeing compensation, the plan must ensure 
that displaced persons receive information about their rights 
and options in connection with the resettlement.  Furthermore, 
displaced persons must be consulted, and provided with feasible 
resettlement alternatives64 and grievance mechanisms.65 
Read together, the OP 4.12 and the Bank Procedure 4.12 pro-
vide for project supervision in rather general terms, leaving a 
margin of discretion to the regional vice-president to determine 
appropriate measures.66  However, there are a certain number 
of criteria establishing how supervision should be undertaken.  
The mission of supervision should include providing social, fi-
nancial, legal, and technical expertise, as well as assessing 
compliance with the project’s legal documentation.67  Bank su-
pervision has to continue until all the resettlement measures 
have been implemented.68  Once the project is completed, the 
Bank issues an “Implementation Completion Report,” which 
will draw lessons to be applied in future operations.69  If the 
objectives of the resettlement plan have not been attained, the 
Report may include further measures, including increased su-
pervision by the World Bank.70 
Although the Indigenous Peoples’ Operational Directive 
(“OD”) does not refer to any international human rights stan-
dards, it does include substantive benchmarks.71  Development 
  
 63. Id. ¶¶ 6(a), 11(a). 
 64. Id. ¶¶ 6(a)(i), (ii). 
 65. Id. ¶ 13(a). 
 66. Id. ¶ 24; World Bank BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, ¶¶ 14–16. 
 67. World Bank BP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement, supra note 66, ¶¶ 13–
14. 
 68. Id. ¶ 16. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. OD 4.20: Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15.  The Indigenous Peoples 
OD is also in the process of being reviewed.  It also applies to the IFC and 
MIGA, whose specific policies on Indigenous Peoples will be adopted once the 
IBRD issues a definitive version of its policy.  Kingsbury finds “a troubling 
feature the fact that the Bank has neither committed itself to conform to the 
standards of the ILO Convention 169 as minimum requirements in evaluating 
projects, nor undertaken not to support projects that might place a borrowing 
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activities are required to support production systems adapted to 
the needs and environment of indigenous peoples.72  The OD 
states that the advice given to the borrowers should focus on 
the improvement of indigenous peoples’ legislation and the rec-
ognition of indigenous peoples’ land rights.73  The OD refers to 
specific services to be provided to indigenous peoples, such as 
education, health, and training.  In addition, the OD stresses 
that traditional health care methods be considered in planning 
delivery systems for health care.74 
Among the procedural guarantees, the OD is established on 
the assumption that the issues dealing with Indigenous Peoples 
must be based on the informed consent of the indigenous com-
munities themselves.75  Under the OD, the borrower is obliged 
to prepare a culturally appropriate plan for Indigenous Peo-
ples.76  The content of the plan itself should also satisfy some 
procedural obligations, such as a strategy for local participa-
tion,77 an implementation schedule with benchmarks where 
progress can be measured at appropriate intervals, expert 
monitoring, and a detailed financing plan.78  In the appraisal 
process, the World Bank must be satisfied that the indigenous 
peoples have participated meaningfully in the development of 
the plan.79 
Together with other World Bank policies, the above rules 
provide the framework applied to the Chad/Cameroon Project.  
As discussed below, the application of the World Bank policies 
to the Chad/Cameroon Project serves as an example of how to 
turn risky oil developments into investments beneficial to the 
affected communities.80 
  
country in violation of its Convention 169 obligations.”  Kingsbury, supra note 
17, at 326–327. 
 72. World Bank OD 4.20: Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15, ¶ 14(e).   
 73. Id. ¶¶ 15(c), 17. 
 74. Id. ¶ 15(e). 
 75. Id. ¶ 7.  
 76. Id. ¶ 14(a). 
 77. Id. ¶ 15(d). 
 78. Id. ¶¶ 15(g), (h), (i). 
 79. Id. ¶ 18. 
 80. Questions and Answers, supra note 12. 
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III. THE CHAD/CAMEROON PROJECT — AN EXAMPLE OF THE 
APPLICATION OF THE WORLD BANK’S POLICIES. 
On June 6, 2000, the Executive Directors of the World Bank 
approved its participation in the Chad/Cameroon Project.81  The 
approval process had been repeatedly delayed after a long high 
profile campaign bringing together a coalition of NGOs, public 
personalities, and universities criticizing the Project.82  The ex-
traction and pipeline project will drill oil from three oilfields 
(Miandoum, Kome and Bolobo) at the Doba basin (Southern 
Chad) and transport it, for export, through a 1,070 km. pipeline 
to the Atlantic Ocean port of Kribi in Cameroon.83  Because con-
struction is expected to last nearly four years, oil will not flow 
until 2004.84  Oil production will last about 25–30 years.85  The 
total cost of the Project is $3.7 billion dollars.86  The World Bank 
financing includes the participation of both the IBRD and the 
IFC.87 
ExxonMobil, in its capacity as project operator, will carry out 
the drilling on behalf of the consortium.88  Two joint-venture 
pipeline companies — Tchad Oil Transportation Company 
(“TOTCO”) and the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company 
(“COTCO”)89 — will operate the export system.90  ExxonMobil, 
  
 81. Id.  See also The World Bank Group, The Chad-Cameroon Petroleum 
Development and Pipeline Project, Project Overview, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro_overview.htm (last updated 
Aug. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Project Overview].  In this section, I draw exten-
sively from Genoveva Hernández Uriz, To Lend Or Not To Lend: Oil, Human 
Rights, And The World Bank's Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
197 (2001). 
 82. Letter from Eighty-six NGOs in Twenty-eight Countries to James D. 
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, Concerning the Chad/Cameroon Oil 
& Pipeline (July 9, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wolfensohn Letter] 
(calling for the suspension of World Bank support until full respect for human 
rights and compliance with World Bank policies could be fully guaranteed). 
 83. ESSO EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION CHAD INC., ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & UPDATE, chs. 4, 9, available at 
http://www.esso.com/eaff/essochad/documentation/englishsummary [hereinaf-
ter ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 3-1. 
 86. Id. at 2-6.  See also Project Overview, supra note 81. 
 87. See Project Overview, supra note 81. 
 88. ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ch. 2. 
 89. Id. at 2-6.  Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. is the Consor-
tium designated operator for the oilfield.  The pipeline transportation system 
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Petronas and ChevronTexaco will jointly hold about 80% of the 
shares in the pipeline companies.91  Chad owns minority inter-
ests in both pipeline companies, while Cameroon only holds a 
minority stake in COTCO, the Cameroon pipeline company.92  
Under the current contractual agreements, the consortium will 
be in charge of financing, managing, and selling the  crude oil.93  
“Chad will receive a percentage of the sale proceeds in royal-
ties,94 and Cameroon will receive transportation fees and 
taxes.”95  The Project’s sponsors argue that the Project will 
benefit Chad through the application of oil revenues to health, 
education, rural development, and infrastructure programs.96  
This will help Chad, one of the poorest and least developed 
countries in the world, to alleviate poverty. 
The human rights risks that the Project poses have been at 
the center of an NGO campaign to halt the Project.  Requesting 
a two-year moratorium, critics argued that the Project should 
not proceed until a number of environmental, good governance, 
and human rights concerns had been resolved.97  Critics feared 
that the tragic outcomes, brought on by oil exploitation in un-
stable environments under repressive regimes, such as in Nige-
ria, would be repeated in the case of Chad.98  In fact, the under-
  
will be owned by the Tchad Oil Transportation Company (“TOTCO”) and the 
Cameroon Oil Transportation Company (“COTCO”), the two companies that 
have been formed for this purpose. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 2-1.  Under the current agreements, Chad will receive the follow-
ing direct revenues: (i) royalty payments; (ii) an upstream corporate income 
tax on the consortium; (iii) a pipeline corporate income tax on TOTCO (the 
pipeline company for Chad); and (iv) dividends for its equity holdings in 
TOTCO and COTCO.  See Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 67.  
The compensation received by the Chadian government has been fixed at 
12.5% of the crude oil price.  The Consortium enjoys an almost full tax exemp-
tion that will not be withdrawn unless the barrel price exceeds $17.  Thomas 
Sotinel, Le Tchad Face aux Sirènes Pétrolières, LE MONDE, Sept. 3, 1998, at 
13, available at LEXIS, News Library, French Language News File. 
 95. ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, at 2-1.  
 96. Project Overview, supra note 81. 
 97. See Wolfson Letter, supra, note 82. 
 98. Korinna Horta, Questions Concerning the World Bank and 
Chad/Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project — Makings of a New Ogoniland? 
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lying human rights issues are numerous.  The country has ex-
perienced an intermittent civil war.99  Ethnic politics are ex-
tremely complicated in the country, and they may be exacer-
bated by an unfair distribution of the oil benefits and costs.100  
This risk is a real one, because the government is accused of 
corruption and of managing the country’s affairs to the advan-
tage of its leader’s ethnic clan.101  Although the current govern-
ment claims to have restored democracy, it has a very deficient 
record on human rights.102  For example, massive killings have 
been reported in the oil producing regions.103  Chad’s extreme 
poverty and underdevelopment accentuate its political instabil-
ity. 
The Bank, however, has enthusiastically defended the 
Chad/Cameroon Project, arguing that its involvement will not 
only ensure an orthodox application of environmental and social 
guidelines — including the fairness of the participation process 
— but also that this commercial operation will turn into a large -
scale development program.104  Challenging the arguments 
against issuing a loan to a steady human rights violator, such 
  
Corporate Welfare Disguised as Aid to the Poor? (Mar. 1, 1997), at 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentID=1019&Page=1. 
 99. For a study of Chad’s recent history, see DERLEMARI NEBARDOUM , LE  
LABYRINTHE DE L’INSTABILITE POLITIQUE AU CHAD (1998); MARIO JOAQUIM 
AZEVEDO, CHAD: A NATION IN SEARCH OF ITS FUTURE  (1998). 
 100. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CHAD COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1998 (1999), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/ 
1998_hrp_report/chad.html [hereinafter CHAD HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998)]. 
 101. AGIR ICI ET SURVIE, PROJET PÉTROLIER TCHAD-CAMEROUN, DÉS PIPÉS SUR 
LE PIPE-LINE 39–40, (Les “Dossiers Noirs” de la Politique Africaine de la 
France No. 13) (1999). 
 102. In December 1990, Colonel Idriss Déby seized power and Habre fled 
the country.  Robert Buijtenhuijs, Les interventions militaires françaises: le 
cas du Tchad, in ETATS ET SOCIÉTÉS EN AFRIQUE FRANCOPHONE  251 (Daniel C. 
Bach et Anthony A. Kirk-Greene dir., 1993).  Chad has been monitored under 
the Human Rights Commission confidential procedure 1503.  Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Chad, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1998/R.3 (1998) [hereinafter UN Report]. 
 103. Human rights organisations reported approximately 200 extrajudicial 
killings in two repressive campaigns undertaken in November 1997 and 
March 1998.  One hundred unarmed people were killed.  See Wolfensohn Let-
ter, supra note 82.  See also CHAD HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1998), supra note 
100; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CHAD COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr (last visited Jan. 
25, 2002). 
 104. Questions and Answers, supra note 12. 
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as the Chadian government, the Bank has reacted by emphasiz-
ing that oil extraction is the only opportunity to further the 
Chadian people’s economic and social rights.105  Moreover, the 
Project fits into one of the Bank’s main strategic priorities — 
promoting development through private sector involvement.106 
The companies carrying out this investment consider the 
Bank’s involvement as essential in order to mitigate their risks 
and safeguard their image as “good” corporate citizens willing 
to abide by high social and environmental standards.107  The 
Bank affirms that it facilitates the companies’ access to credit 
and mitigates their political risks.108  Whether this is actually 
the case or not, oil companies in the Chad/Cameroon Project 
have, in fact, relied heavily on the World Bank’s imprimatur.  
Significantly, ExxonMobil publicly announced that it would not 
proceed without the World Bank’s participation and acknowl-
edged the marketing importance of a clean human rights repu-
tation.109 
The World Bank’s involvement in the Project has implied the 
application of its Operational Manual to the process.110  A num-
ber of policies were applicable because the Project was not only 
environmentally sensitive, having an impact on a number of 
forests and natural habitats, but also involved resettlement in 
the oil field areas and affected indigenous peoples in Camer-
oon.111  The Chad/Cameroon Project was deemed a Category A 
project, thereby requiring the most robust environmental as-
sessment, disclosure, and consultation processes.112  This proc-
ess has been protracted.  The consortium claims to have started 
“one of the most extensive consultation efforts ever undertaken 
in Africa” as early as 1993.113  Indeed, Project sponsors claim to 
have held nearly 900 village-level public meetings in both coun-
tries and have put a nineteen-volume informational package 
  
 105. Id. 
 106. Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 20. 
 107. Id. at 22–23.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Interview with Jean-Pierre Petit, CEO, Esso Tchad S.A., in N’djamena, 
Chad (Jul. 20, 1999) (on file with author).  See also Project Appraisal Docu-
ment, supra note 13, at 22. 
 110. ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ch. 2. 
 111. Id. ch. 7. 
 112. Id. chs. 4 & 9. 
 113. Id. at 9-1. 
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about the Project at the public disposal in reading rooms 
throughout Chad and Cameroon.114  The debate has been in-
tense at the local NGO level.115  Nevertheless, certain problems 
flaw the consultation process, such as the presence of armed 
guards through out the consultation and the content of the con-
sultation materials, which seem to be more suitable for adver-
tising than for meaningful discourse.116 
Similar issues arise when looking closer at other aspects of 
the Project, such as the Environmental Management Plan 
(“EMP”) and the resettlement process.  The Bank turned down 
the first Environmental Assessment (“EA”) submitted by the 
Consortium and the two governments as unsatisfactory.117  The 
definitive version of the EMP established a series of measures 
in order to ensure that the facilities are as least disruptive as 
possible.118  However, NGOs still complain about the lack of cer-
tainty of environmental safeguards.119  More troubling, how-
ever, is the shifting of the monitoring responsibility to the gov-
  
 114. Id. Apart from village meetings, the information campaign has con-
ducted one-on-one interviews with the concerned populations.  According to 
the consortium, consultation has taken place in several languages.  The pro-
ject sponsors argue that, apart from the Environmental Assessment and con-
sultation process, World Bank involvement has placed pressure on the 
Chadian government to modify its legislation and set up national mechanisms 
to oversee the oil revenues. 
 115. See Alan Beattie, World Bank Team Attacks Own Oil Project, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 4; Gus Constantine, Rights Record De-
fended in Bid for Pipeline Fund, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 2001, at A10. 
 116. An important tool of the consultation process consisted of a twenty-
minute video shown in the villages.  But the video’s explanation takes place at 
a very fast pace with relatively loud background music and stresses only the 
positive aspects of the oil project.  Government officials appear in the video, 
confidently assuring that oil extraction will actually take place.  This cer-
tainty, expressed by officials in a country always subjected to authoritarian 
rule, turns the video into propaganda, rather than information or consulta-
tion.  (This information was gathered pursuant to a field study by the author 
at Esso Tchad S.A., N’djamena, Chad (Jul. 20, 1999)).  Furthermore, although 
the nineteen-volume information package is very comprehensive, it cannot be 
very effective in a country with a 49.7% illiteracy rate and where many people 
cannot even reach the reading rooms. 
 117. AGIR ICI ET SURVIE, supra note 101, at 44–46. 
 118. For example, the pipeline will be buried one meter below ground and 
there will be a monitoring system to prevent oil spills.  See Questions and 
Answers, supra note 12, ¶ 4. 
 119. Wolfensohn Letter, supra note 82. 
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ernments of Chad and Cameroon.120  There is a danger that the 
technical advice provided by the Bank to both governments 
would not be enough to ensure that they will have the capacity 
or the will to satisfactorily carry out that role. 
The creation of independent oversight mechanisms repre-
sents more innovative legal developments.  These mechanisms 
work both internally through the reform of Chadian law, and 
externally through the appointment of international supervis-
ing bodies.  Under the pressure from the World Bank, the 
Chadian government has adopted revenue management meas-
ures, described by the Bank’s literature as proof of the Chadian 
government’s commitment to clean management.121  The meas-
ures consist mainly of a law — the Revenue Management Law 
— which states how the oil proceeds will be distributed and cre-
ates a monitoring committee.  The monitoring committee is 
formed by representatives of different constituencies in Chad, 
including four civil society representatives.122 
On the international level, one of the loan conditions was the 
creation of an independent International Advisory Group 
(“IAG”) to provide an additional guarantee to the project moni-
toring.123  The IAG advises the governments of Chad and Cam-
eroon on project implementation; identifying any potential prob-
lems.  The IAG reports its findings to the World Bank President 
and to the governments of both Chad and Cameroon.124  The 
structure and functioning of the IAG, as defined by the terms of 
  
 120. Project Appraisal Document, supra note 13, at 128–130. 
 121. Id. at 22. 
 122. LAW ON REVENUE M ANAGEMENT , Act No. 001/PR/99, Republic of Chad 
(1999), reprinted in Project Appraisal Document , supra note 13, at 101 [here-
inafter OIL REVENUE MANAGEMENT LAW]. 
 123. Press Release, The World Bank, World Bank Appoints International 
Advisory Group on the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline 
Project, No. 2001/235/S (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org 
[hereinafter World Bank Press Release].  The work of the advisory group will 
be supplemented by a panel of independent experts advising the governments 
of Chad and Cameroon Environmental and Social Experts Panel (“ESEP”) and 
an External Compliance Monitoring Group (“ECMG”) in charge of monitoring 
the implementation of the Environmental Management Plan.  
 124. THE WORLD BANK , THE CHAD-CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE 
PROJECT INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP ON THE CHAD-CAMEROON PIPELINE 
AND RELATED PROJECTS — TERMS OF REFERENCE , ¶¶ 5, 17, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/iag_tor_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 
25, 2002) [hereinafter CHAD-CAMEROON  TERMS OF REFERENCE]. 
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reference released by the Bank, seeks to ensure the monitoring 
body’s independence.  The IAG is composed of six independent 
experts of international prestige.125 The IAG travels to Chad at 
least twice a year and defines the focus of its own work.126 
When this long, highly publicized, and contested process is 
compared to oil investments in other repressive countries, such 
as Burma or Sudan, it seems more likely that the oil companies 
and Chadian and Camerounian governments will be closely 
scrutinized.  This scrutiny will hopefully improve their behav-
ior.  Moreover, the discussions over the Project have fostered a 
participation culture within local communities, which will be 
difficult to eliminate. 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that the Project, presented as an 
ideal model to the international community, will end up being a 
failure.  The Bank’s disregard for certain realities of life in 
Chad and Cameroon, specifically concerning good governance 
and human rights, may render the guarantees cosmetic or, at 
best, only confront problems partially.  The attitude of the 
Bank’s staff has been quite defensive throughout the process, 
and one wonders whether their treatment of the problems is a 
defensive reaction to the criticism or the result of a genuine 
plan.127   
A good example of this concern is the oversight board created 
under the Revenue Management Law.  The board consists of a 
Supreme Court magistrate, two Members of Parliament, four 
high-ranking officials, and four civil society representatives.128  
In principle, one might well think that a board with such broad 
representation would be perfectly suited to guarantee the 
transparency and fairness of the expenses.  However, a closer 
  
 125. Id. ¶ 4.  See also World Bank Press Release, supra note 123. 
 126. See World Bank Press Release, supra note 123; ESSO ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 83, ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 127. At the time of this writing, the project has already been the subject of 
an Inspection Panel request for investigation.  In September 2001, the Inspec-
tion Panel had issued a report recommending that the Executive Directors 
open a full investigation.  THE WORLD BANK, INSPECTION PANEL, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATION ON REQUEST FOR INSPECTION (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/IPN/ipnweb.nsf. 
 128. OIL REVENUE MANAGEMENT LAW, supra note 122, art. 16.  In spite of the 
amendment, increasing the number of civil society representatives, the num-
ber of votes that is likely to endorse the government’s positions still represent 
a majority. 
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inspection of its composition and within the Chadian context 
shows two fundamental weaknesses. Given the lack of inde-
pendence of the judiciary and the non-existence of parliamen-
tary opposition, five of the nine votes are likely to endorse the 
government’s position.129  Another excellent example of the 
Board’s weakness is the public finance management training 
the World Bank provides to parliamentarians.  The World 
Bank’s technical advice would be extremely helpful if a mean-
ingful parliamentary opposition existed.  However, such train-
ing is of little value when members of parliament who oppose 
the Project are sent to jail.130  Thus, judges and members of par-
liament will fail to perform their jobs properly if they are sub-
ject to removal or if they must succumb, through clientele rela-
tions, to the political party in power. 
Finally, an unsolved problem is what will happen when in-
ternational public pressure stops.  The IAG is expected to work 
for up to ten years.131  However, if Chad does not meet its com-
mitments, it is plausible that the World Bank might apply pres-
sure through further lending or through debt relief programs.132  
Nevertheless, the mandate of the IAG should at least be renew-
able in order to guarantee a long-term oversight mechanism. 
  
 129. Institutions in Chad are dysfunctional and the country lacks a strong 
parliamentary opposition.  See UN Report, supra note 102.  See also AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL , AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2001, available at 
http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2001.nsf/webafrcountries/CHAD?OpenDoc
ument.  The judiciary has not consolidated its independence from the execu-
tive.  The government institutions act with impunity and without accountabil-
ity.  For a detailed analysis, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TCHAD: U.N. PAYS  
SOUMIS A L’ARBITRAIRE DES FORCES DE SECURITE AVEC LA COMPLAISANCE DE PAYS 
ETRANGERS  (1996). 
 130. Interview with Ngarléjy Yorongar Le Moïban, Chadian Member of 
Parliament and opposition member in N’djaména, Chad (July, 1997) (on file 
with author).  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 
123–124 (1999).  See also Union Interparlementaire, Comité des Droits de 
l’Homme des Parlementaires.  Rapport de la Délégation du Comité sur sa 
Mission au Tchad (21–27 Novembre 1998.  Cas No. Chd/01 Ngarléjy Yorongar) 
(on file with the author). 
 131. CHAD-CAMEROON — TERMS OF REFERENCE , supra note 124, ¶ 11. 
 132. Interview with Mary Barton-Dock, World Bank Representative in 
Chad, N’djamena (Jul. 26, 1999) (on file with author). 
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND THE 
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY. 
Private sector development has become a main priority for 
the World Bank.133  An analysis of the IFC and the MIGA as 
promoters of responsible investment is justified because they 
are the fastest growing agencies within the World Bank.134  The 
demand for their services has significantly increased as direct 
investment continues to grow in developing countries.135  The 
role of the IFC is especially relevant to the oil sector, because 
the extraction industries currently occupy the third place in the 
IFC’s loan portfolio.136  The MIGA’s role in the oil industry is 
currently smaller, representing only 3% of the industry’s opera-
tions.137  Though lesser involved, this article will also refer to 
the MIGA’s policies and procedures, because MIGA shares the 
same mechanisms for addressing the grievances of affected 
  
 133. Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, in 
LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17, 35 
(Menno J. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Ziarifi eds., 2000).  During 1997 and 1998, 
the World Bank launched the initiative Business Partners for Development 
(“BPD”), an informal global network of business, governments, and civil soci-
ety with the Word Bank Group as an equal partner.  The BPD aims to demon-
strate the positive impact of tri-sector partnership both for the development 
and the business impact through the integration of corporate responsibility 
values in business. 
 134. BANK INFORMATION CENTER, TOOLKITS FOR ADVOCATES: THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CORPORATION AND THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT 
GUARANTEE AGENCY, available at http://www.bicusa.org/toolkits/ifcmiga.htm 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter IFC AND MIGA  TOOLKIT].   
 135. Id.  In March 1998, MIGA’s Board approved a recommendation to the 
Board of Governors on a general capital increase, doubling the Agency’s capi-
tal base from $1 billion to $2 billion.  The objective of this capital increase is to 
support the growth of MIGA’s gross exposure, which is expected to increase to 
approximately $10–15 billion.  See Motomichi Ikawa, Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency, in THE WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 24 (Edith 
Brown Weiss et al. eds., 1999).  The capital increase was blocked by the U.S. 
 136. This represents 15% of IFC’s portfolio.  Loans granted in 1999 to the 
extractive sector amounted to $789.9 million.  IFC AND MIGA  TOOLKIT, supra 
note 134. 
 137. Id. at 5.  This amounts to $111 million.  According to an official, MIGA 
has entered into very few contracts in the oil & gas sector.  It currently has 
three gas pipeline projects (all are buried), one offshore oil and gas production 
project, and one small LPG terminal. 
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communities as the IFC, and due to the MIGA’s vocation to act 
as a standard-setter for the petroleum industry.138 
The IFC was created in 1956 as the private sector arm of the 
World Bank Group.139  Its purpose is “to further economic deve l-
opment by encouraging the growth of productive private enter-
prise in member countries.”140  Since its creation, the IFC has 
worked with nearly 2000 companies in 129 countries.141  The 
IFC offers its clients a number of services at market rates.  The 
best known of these services is project financing.  There are 
several types of loan products.  The IFC grants loans directly to 
investors (so-called “A loans”), which are made on regular mar-
ket terms.142  The IFC also mobilizes private capital through 
syndicated loans with a group of banks (so-called “B loans”).143  
Additionally, the IFC also carries out equity investments: it 
purchases a stake in a project, which it eventually sells.144  Be-
tween debt and equity, some intermediate products exist, such 
as subordinated loans.145  In this case, the loans are paid back to 
the IFC only after other lenders have been paid back.146  Only 
through its lending operations, does the IFC have a significant 
impact on responsible investment.  Currently, about 220 com-
mercial banks and institutional investors participate in IFC’s B 
  
 138. Ikawa, supra note 135, at 26. 
 139. The creation of the IFC and IDA may be seen partly as the compensa-
tion for the failure to create a Special UN Fund for Economic Development 
(“SUNFED”).  Developing countries proposed to create such an agency under 
UN control to foster grant or soft loan based investment support.  SUNFED 
can be seen as the first sustained effort to use collective strength by a UN 
majority to force structural change in the world economy to the benefit of poor 
countries.  BERGESEN & LUNDE, supra note 2, at 41. 
 140. IFC Articles of Agreement, supra note 4, art. 1. 
 141. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 1. 
 142. IFC, Loans for IFC’s Own Account: A-loans, at 
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/loans/loans.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2002).  
 143. IFC, Syndicated Loans: The B-loan program, at 
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/syndication/syndication.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2002). 
 144. IFC, Equity Financing, at 
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/equity/equity.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2002).  
 145. IFC, Quasi-Equity Financing: C-loans, at 
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/quasi/quasi.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2002). 
 146. Id. 
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loans, most of them from Europe, North America, and Asia.147  
These investors participate in a broad range of industries, in-
cluding mining and energy.148  In March 2002, the IFC was ad-
ministering $6.6 billion in loans for others.149 
The MIGA started its work in 1988.150  So far, it has insured 
around 300 investments in 52 countries.151  The objective of the 
MIGA Convention is to promote the flow of productive foreign 
investment from the developed to the developing countries.152  
  
 147. IFC, The Syndicated Loan Program, at http://www.ifc.org/syndications 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2002). 
 148. Id. 
 149. IFC Annual Report 2001, Portfolio Review, at 
http://www.ifc.org/ar2001/review/portfolio.html.  Apart from its project financ-
ing services, the IFC offers other advisory and risk management services. The 
advising consists in the provision of technical assistance to promote private 
sector growth in developing countries.  This advice can be targeted to the pri-
vate sector (e.g., helping entrepreneurs develop project proposals) or to the 
public sector (e.g., assisting with private sector institution building). The 
technical assistance to developing countries has actively promoted privatisa-
tion as a means of furthering private sector development and the attraction of 
foreign investment.  The legal and technical advice is carried out through the 
Technical Assistance Trust Funds Program (“TAFT”).  The IFC has also cre-
ated the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (“FIAS”) to assist developing 
countries in how to attract larger amounts of foreign direct investment.  See 
IFC, Technical Assistance and IFC Advisory Services, available at  
http://www.ifc.org/proserv/services/ta/ta.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
  The IFC’s Risk Management Program was launched in 1990.  It in-
tends to facilitate the access of Third World private sector entities to the de-
rivative markets to reduce their currency risks.  IFC, Risk Management Prod-
ucts and Services, available at http://www.ifc.org/proserv/products/risk/risk 
.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). 
 150. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, Apr. 12, 1988, 1508 U.N.T.S. 181, 199, 24 I.L.M. 1605 [hereinafter 
MIGA Convention].  For a study of the MIGA Convention see generally, Jean 
Touscoz, Les Opérations de Garantie de L’Agence Multilaterale des Investisse-
ments (AMGI), 114 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 901 (1987).  The draft-
ing of the MIGA Convention was parallel to the drafting of a set of guidelines 
for the treatment of investors directed at the states signatories of the MIGA 
Convention.  These guidelines have the form of recommendation to the states 
members of the World Bank Group.  See generally IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, 
LEGAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT : THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES  
(1993). 
 151. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 1. 
 152. Art. 23 of the MIGA Convention states: “The Agency shall carry out 
research, undertake activities to promote investment flows and disseminate 
information on investment opportunities in developing member countries with 
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At the time of its creation, the MIGA was designed not only to 
create a multilateral system of investment guarantees, but also 
to restore a climate of confidence after the instable period fol-
lowing decolonization.153  The MIGA provides private investors 
insurance against the following risks: war and civil disturbance, 
breach of contract, currency inconvertibility, and expropria-
tion.154  When the MIGA grants an insurance contract for an 
investment in a signatory country, the country must grant its 
approval to the issuance of it guarantee by the MIGA.155  Once 
the MIGA pays compensation to a holder of a guarantee, it sub-
rogates to the rights or claims that the holder of a guarantee 
had against the host country and other obligors.156  The MIGA 
also offers a range of advisory services, for which it charges 
market rates.157 
The IFC requires that the projects it supports meet a number 
of guidelines.  This means that the project must be technically 
and environmentally sound, beneficial to the local economy, and 
potentially profitable.158  Relatively recently, the IFC has 
adopted its own policies tailored to the private sector in a broad 
number of areas.159  Prior to adopting its own policies, the IFC 
  
a view to improving the environment for foreign investment flows in such 
countries.”  MIGA Convention, supra note 150, art. 11. 
 153. Touscoz, supra note 150, at 901–902. 
 154. MIGA Convention, supra note 150, art. 11. 
 155. Id. art. 15. 
 156. Id. art. 18(a). 
 157. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 4. 
 158. IFC, Operational Policy 4.01: Environmental Assessment § 1 (Oct. 
1998) [hereinafter IFC OP].  A similar language is used by MIGA, whose as-
serted policy is that all the investments it facilitates are carried out in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner.  See MIGA, Environmental 
and Social Review Procedures, Introduction, available at 
http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose/soc_rev.htm (last visited, Jan. 
25, 2002). 
 159. The IFC has adopted its own policies in the following areas: Environ-
mental Assessment, IFC OP 4.01 (Oct. 1998); Natural Habitats, IFC OP 4.04 
(Nov. 1998); Pest Management, IFC OP 4.09 (Nov. 1998); Forestry, IFC OP 
4.36 (Nov. 1998); Safety of Dams, IFC OP 4.37 (Sept. 1996); International 
Waterways, IFC OP 7.50 (Nov. 1998); Indigenous Peoples, IFC OD 4.20 (Sept. 
1991); Involuntary Resettlement, IFC OD 4.30 (June 1990); Cultural Prop-
erty, World Bank Operational Policy Note 11.03 (Sept. 1986); Child and 
Forced Labor, Policy Statement (March 1998).  See IFC, ENVIRONMENT: 
SAFEGUARD POLICIES (2000), at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/EnvSoc/Safeguard/ 
safeguard.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).   
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referred to the IBRD’s, without providing any further detail.  In 
fact, an oil investment failure in Guatemala prompted the IFC 
to adopt its own policies.160 
The IFC granted two loans to the U.S. oil company Basic Re-
sources International Ltd. (“BASIC”) to support the construc-
tion of an oil pipeline and to allow for expansion of the compa-
nies’ activities in the Maya Biosphere Rain Forest in 1994 and 
1996 respectively.161  The construction of the oil pipeline was to 
take place in La Laguna del Tigre National Park, recognized as 
a wetland of international importance by the Ramsar Conven-
tion on Wetlands of 1971, ratified by Guatemala in 1990.162  The 
first lending package was approved in 1995.163  NGOs claimed 
that the environmental assessment was insufficient because 
even if the IFC categorized the Project as Category A, the 
proper consultation and public participation did not take 
place.164  The US-based NGO Conservation International (“CI”) 
met with the IFC twice during 1994–95 to recommend changes 
in the pipeline route and to promote the creation and imple-
mentation of an environmental mitigation plan.165  The IFC, 
  
 160. Another project that prompted this need for specific policies was the 
Pangue Hydroelectric Project in Chile.  See Bretton Woods Project, Bretton 
Woods Update No. 9 — Apr. 1998, at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/ 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/update/09/09b.html (last visited, Jan. 25, 2002). 
 161. FRANCESCO MARTONE , OIL DRILLING IN THE GUATEMALAN RAINFOREST: A  
SKELETON IN THE IFC’S CLOSET (Campagna per la Riforma della Banca 
Mondiale, Sept. 2000), available at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifccaseguatemala. 
html. 
 162. Id.  Although, by law oil development is prohibited within the core 
zones of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, BASIC’s operations were “grand-
fathered” into the national park because the concession was granted in 1985, 
five years before the reserve and park were created in 1990.  The company’s 
concession was granted in 1985, five years before the creation of the reserve 
and the park.  BASIC’s 1985 concession covered about 3% of the current area 
of La Laguna del Tigre National Park.  However, in 1992, two years after the 
establishment of La Laguna del Tigre as a national park and a core zone 
within the Maya Biosphere Reserve, BASIC was granted a second concession 
that expanded the concession area to cover more than 60% of the park.  See 
IAN A. BOWLES ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL CORPORATION LENDING AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM : A CASE STUDY 
OF CONSERVATION AND OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE GUATEMALAN PETEN, available 
at http://www.law.ufl.edu/cgr/publications/environmental_impacts.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2002).  
 163. MARTONE, supra note 161. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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however, replied that no route changes were possible and that 
the environmental assessment sufficiently addressed environ-
mental mitigation measures.166 
A second IFC loan was approved in 1996.167  The consultation 
process had improved, but local communities were still not in-
volved in the discussion and formulation of the environmental 
assessment and environmental management plan required for 
Category A projects.  Public access to documents was not guar-
anteed, and the only available copies were in English at 
BASIC’s headquarters in Guatemala City.168  Nevertheless, 
some NGOs obtained the Project documents and formulated a 
series of recommendations.169  The NGOs claimed that the Pro-
ject violated certain World Bank policies, especially the Natural 
Habitats Operational Policy, which obliges the Bank to fund 
projects only when “comprehensive analysis demonstrates that 
overall benefits from the project substantially outweigh the en-
vironmental costs.”170  An improved environmental manage-
ment plan was produced, but BASIC had already started con-
struction activities before the IFC Board had approved the loan 
in July 1996.171  Whatever the merits of the NGOs’ allegations 
were, this and other similar projects showed that the consulta-
tion and public disclosure record among IFC projects was weak. 
The IFC’s own policies cover the following areas: environ-
mental assessment, natural habitats, pest management, for-
estry, projects on international waterways, and the safeguard-
ing of cultural property.172  In areas where the IFC has not yet 
adopted its own policy, such as indigenous peoples and involun-
tary resettlement, it applies the relevant IBRD policy.173  A 
similar framework is applied to MIGA, which adopted its own 
  
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  A new World Bank Operational Policy and Bank Procedure on 
Natural Habitats was adopted by the World Bank in June 2001.  The new 
World Bank OP 4.04: Natural Habitats, ¶ 5, maintains the same requirement. 
 171. MARTONE, supra note 161, at 3. 
 172. See sources cited supra note 162.  See also IFC Environmental & Social 
Review, supra note 38, ¶ 6, Table 1. 
 173. See IFC Environmental & Social Review, supra note 38. 
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Environmental Assessment Policy in 1999.174  The MIGA also 
incorporates by reference IFC policies, “where applicable.”175  
Finally, the MIGA applies the World Bank Environmental 
Guidelines to all projects.176 
Both IFC and MIGA have recently adopted relatively specific 
policies on child labor.  According to its policy statement, IFC 
will not support projects that use forced labor or child labor.177  
The MIGA applies a similar policy.178  However, no specific pol-
icy exists relating to other labor standards, although the IFC’s 
Policy Statement affirms that “[p]rojects should comply with 
the national laws of the host countries, including those that 
protect core labor standards and related treaties ratified by the 
host countries.”179  The Policy Statement fails to define core la-
bor standards.  It is questionable whether a general reference to 
“national laws of the host countries” represents enough protec-
tion against labor abuse in the projects, especially in countries 
that do not guarantee basic freedoms such as freedom of asso-
ciation.  Although non-compliance with local laws and regula-
tions now allows the IFC to call in a loan, it is doubtful whether 
respect for workers’ basic rights has really been mainstreamed 
as an essential aspect of the agencies’ operations.180  As a mat-
ter of fact, when IFC management certifies that the project is in 
accordance with the Operational Policies during the project cy-
cle, it does not certify the project’s performance against host 
  
 174. MIGA, Environmental Assessment Policy (Annex B to MIGA’s Opera-
tional Regulations), Environment and Disclosure Policies , at 
http://www.miga.org/screens/policies/disclose/environ.htm (last visited, Jan. 
25, 2002) [hereinafter MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy]. 
 175. See MIGA Environmental & Social Review , supra note 38, ¶ 14. 
 176. Id. ¶ 11. 
 177. IFC, POLICY STATEMENT ON FORCED LABOR AND HARMFUL CHILD LABOR 
(Mar. 1998), available at http://www.ifc.org/enviro/enviro/childlabor/Child_ 
and_Forced_Labor.pdf [hereinafter FORCED LABOR POLICY STATEMENT]. 
 178. In 1998, new provisions were introduced in MIGA’s contract of guaran-
tee requiring guarantee holders to refrain from employing harmful child la-
bour and or forced labour.  These amendments also entitle MIGA to terminate 
a contract if the investment project does not meet these labour standards, 
although the client can bring them into compliance if MIGA determines that 
the situation can be corrected.  Ikawa, supra note 135, at 26. 
 179. FORCED LABOR POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 177. 
 180. Id.  The usual practice is to give the client some time to put itself in 
compliance and then call the loan.  A similar mechanism is applied by MIGA. 
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country labor requirements.181  Thus, it would be necessary to 
adopt an operational policy requiring compliance at least with 
the core labor standards enshrined in the 1998 International 
Labour Organisation (“ILO”) Declaration.182  This operational 
policy should also include social protections in project assess-
ments and especially in project monitoring.183 
Both private sector branches of the World Bank share the 
same dispute settlement mechanism, the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (“CAO”), which is less well known than its World 
Bank counterpart — the Inspection Panel.184  The CAO post was 
created in 1999 to enhance the overall performance and ac-
countability of the IFC and MIGA in the social and environ-
mental areas.185  Its creation resulted from a broad consultation 
between the IFC, MIGA, NGOs, members of the business com-
munity, and populations affected by IFC projects in the past.186  
The main NGOs advocated for the extension of the World Bank 
Inspection Panel to the private arm branches of the Bank.187  It 
has been argued that the IFC resisted submitting to the World 
Bank Inspection Panel, in spite of the pressure by some share-
holders and that the CAO was created as a sort of compromise 
  
 181. IFC Environmental & Social Review, supra note 38. This is also the 
case in MIGA’s clearance procedure.  MIGA Environmental & Social Review, 
supra note 38. 
 182. International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work, Gen. Conf. Res., 86th Sess. (June 19, 1998), re-
printed in 37 I.L.M. 1233 (1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration]. 
 183. Id.  These principles are: freedom of association and the effective rec-
ognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  Id. 
art. 2. 
 184. For a study of the World Bank Inspection Panel, see Daniel D. Brad-
low, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT ’L L. 553 (1994); ALVARO UMAÑA 
QUESADA , THE INSPECTION PANEL’S EXPERIENCE  (1998).  But see James Thuo 
Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and 
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.  
REV. 107, 166 (1999).  For Gatthii, the Inspection Panel “is simply another one 
of the Bank’s strategies of opening itself up to scrutiny on its own terms 
within its predefined projects and programs and on its own turf.”  Id. at 166.  
The Panel, thus, gives the Bank the possibility of acting like a judge in its own 
cause. 
 185. IFC AND MIGA TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 5. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 6. 
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alternative.188  The CAO has been working for only a short time 
so it is still very early to assess its effect.  Even if the CAO is 
not able to provide a judicial-type review of policy compliance, it 
can provide useful ways of addressing certain shortcomings in 
IFC/MIGA projects.  In some cases, as will be argued below, the 
CAO may be more effective than the World Bank Inspection 
Panel, because it is less dependent on the Board of Directors. 
The CAO has three roles: (a) to respond to the complaints by 
persons who are affected by projects and attempt to resolve the 
issues raised (the ombudsman role); (b) to provide independent 
advice to the President and senior management of IFC and 
MIGA (the advisor role); and (c) to oversee audits of IFC and 
MIGA social and environmental performance (the compliance 
role).189  The three roles may overlap.  For example, the CAO 
may initiate a compliance audit on its own initiative following a 
complaint.190 
Three characteristics describe the CAO’s role: independence 
from management, flexibility in its approach to problems, and a 
lack of “hard” authority to impose the solutions proposed.191  
The very open grounds for lodging a complaint demonstrate the 
CAO’s flexibility.  Complainants may refer to the non-
compliance of particular guidelines or address policy issues.192  
In this respect, it is easier to address a complaint to the CAO 
than to the World Bank Inspection Panel, because a complaint 
to the latter must refer to a particular policy that has been vio-
lated.  Moreover, only the violation of the Bank’s Operational 
  
 188. Id. 
 189. IFC, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE OFFICE OF THE IFC/MIGA  
COMPLIANCE ADVISOR /OMBUDSMAN , § 1.1.2 (Apr. 2000), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/cao/english/guidelines/ENGLISH_09-20-00_pdf [hereinafter 
CAO GUIDELINES].  On the audit role, guidelines have been developed by CAO.  
See CAO, CAO COMPLIANCE AUDIT ROLE: GUIDANCE ON COMPLIANCE AUDITING 
AND ENHANCING OUTCOMES (June 2002), at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org. 
 190. Id. § 5.1.2. An important part of the advisory role is commenting on the 
existing policies and their application in practice.  A human rights sensitive 
CAO may have a very important impact in this field. 
 191. Id. § 1.3.2.  The CAO recruits her own staff, is not part of IFC man-
agement, and reports directly to the President of the World Bank.  The idea is 
to gain the trust of people affected by projects. 
 192. Id. § 2.4.1.  The same “flexible” approach is taken with regard to com-
pliance audits.  The very section acknowledges that the operational guidelines 
are susceptible to different interpretations and that audits do not aim at es-
tablishing a different authoritative interpretation.  Id. § 5.1.4. 
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Policies and Procedures, (as opposed to the violation of the 
Bank Good Practices), may render an Inspection Panel com-
plaint acceptable.193  The CAO may choose the means of solving 
a complaint.  For example, it may decide not to deal with the 
complaint under the ombudsman role, and instead provide ad-
vice to IFC and MIGA.194  Once the CAO has decided to act as 
an ombudsman, it has discretion as to which method should be 
used to address the issue: sometimes the solution would be a 
fact-finding mission, sometimes a “problem solving” approach 
through conciliation or mediation.195  For investigation pur-
poses, a proactive CAO may be more effective than the World 
Bank Inspection Panel, because the Executive Directors can 
stop a Panel proposal for an investigation whereas the CAO 
independently decides on the measures to take.196 
Therefore, the main focus of this Ombudsman capacity is to 
foster communication between local communities and project 
sponsors, and to help find solutions that are acceptable to both 
parties.197  The solutions can eventually take a written form.198  
This is important because a final written compromise may then 
give rise to contractual obligations enforceable in local courts or 
arbitration.  Nevertheless, the conciliating role, (as opposed to 
adjudicating), makes the effectiveness of the Ombudsman 
highly dependent on the mediators’ personal skills and experi-
ence, as well as on the magnitude of the problems.  The Guide-
lines state that the Ombudsman will focus “on what is going to 
happen in the future, rather than on what happened in the 
past.”199  Therefore, one may imagine the Ombudsman being 
effective when parties are discussing compensation prices and 
measures, but not where the human rights situation of the local 
populations has drastically deteriorated.  An example would be 
  
 193. IBRD/IDA Resolution, supra note 36, ¶ 12. 
 194. CAO GUIDELINES, supra note 189, at § 3.3.4. 
 195. Id. §§ 3.3.5, 4. 
 196. Compare IBRD/IDA Resolution, supra note 36, ¶ VI, with CAO 
GUIDELINES, supra note 189, § 3.  In fact, a request was denied by the Board of 
Executive Directors in the Itapartica Resettlement and Irrigation Project in 
Brazil, a case where an investigation was recommended by the Inspection 
Panel.  SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, FROM HUMAN CAPITAL TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE I.M.F. 185 (2001). 
 197. CAO GUIDELINES, supra note 189, § 4.1.2. 
 198. Id. § 4.1.5. 
 199. Id. § 2.1.1. 
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a case in which the security forces have been called by the oil 
companies and exercised massive repression in the project area.  
In addition, the lack of specific authority makes the leverage of 
the CAO dependent on the amount of loan money that has al-
ready been disbursed.  As the CAO has acknowledged, “where 
the monies are drawn down, the leverage will be less.”200 
It is important to determine whether the human rights dis-
course is able to improve the content and effectiveness of these 
mechanisms.  For a number of years, the human rights obliga-
tions of international financial institutions have been the sub-
ject of an abundant literature.201  Commentators have stressed 
that the World Bank, as an international organization, is the 
subject of international law and, as such, is bound by general 
rules of international law.202  The problem is how to determine 
the exact content of these obligations.  Sigrun Skogly’s notion of 
  
 200. Id. at Introduction. 
 201. Commentators have dealt with the different dimensions of these obli-
gations.  There is an “internal” human rights dimension, i.e., the integration 
of human rights considerations into its own policies.  The “external” aspect of 
it, i.e. the imposition of human rights conditionalities upon the Bank’s clients 
has also been the subject of a wide debate.  See Victoria E. Marmorstein, 
World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions , 13 J. 
INT’L L. &  ECON. 113 (1978); Sigrun I. Skogly, Structural Adjustment and De-
velopment: Human Rights — An Agenda for Change, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 751 
(1993);  Daniel D. Bradlow & Claudio Grossman, Limited Mandates and Inter-
twined Problems, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 411 (1995); John D. Ciorciari, The Lawful 
Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit Decisions: An Interpre-
tative Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement, 33 CORNELL INT ’L 
L.J. 331 (2000). 
 202. This argument is based on the Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation 
of the Agreement between the WHO and Egypt of 25 March 1951, 1980 I.C.J. 
73, 89–90.  See also Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the I.M.F. and Hu-
man Rights, 6 TRANSNAT ’L L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1996).  Bradlow 
stresses the fact that IFIs cannot violate customary international law.  Id. at 
63.  During the 1960s South African loans controversy, Constantin A. Stavro-
poulos, the U.N. Legal Counsel responded to the Bank’s argumentation that 
human rights were not a political affair but a source of legal obligations under 
the U.N. Charter.  See Statement of the U.N. Legal Counsel to the U.N. 
Fourth Committee, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 150, 171–73 (1967).  Schermers and 
Blokker argue that international organizations, even in the absence of con-
sent, are bound by international law because their subordination to it is 
clearer than that of states.  HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITH DIVERSITY  988 (1995).  On 
responsibility of international organizations, see generally PIERRE KLEIN, LA 
RESPONSABILITE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANS LES ORDRES 
JURIDIQUES INTERNES ET EN DROIT DES GENS (1998). 
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self-policing provides a good approach.203  Under Skogly’s ap-
proach, the  principal obligation of the IFIs would be to insert 
human rights considerations into their own projects in order to 
ensure that human rights are not violated.204  Along the contin-
uum of respecting, protecting, and fulfilling human rights, 
Skogly emphasizes that the World Bank has the obligation to 
respect such rights, deriving from customary law and general 
rules of international law.  However, Skogly believes it would 
not be plausible to argue that the World Bank has the obliga-
tion to promote and fulfill human rights, as these obligations 
derive from treaties to which it is not a party.205  The concept of 
respect involves both a negative obligation to ensure that the 
human rights situation does not deteriorate as a consequence of 
the project, as well as a more positive obligation to observe hu-
man rights as they are currently implemented.206  By the same 
token, the insertion of human rights considerations into World 
Bank contracts may be seen as part of its obligation to respect 
human rights. 
Moreover, it can be argued that mainstreaming human rights 
considerations into project finance should be part of the World 
Bank agencies’ duties to promote sustainable development.  
This argument is consistent with the content of the Bank’s poli-
cies and with the fact that the concept of sustainable develop-
ment is evolving into a general principle of international law.207  
Increasingly, the notion of sustainable development is seen to 
  
 203. See SKOGLY, supra note 196, at 151–52. 
 204. Id.  See also U.N. World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Decla-
ration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 157/24 pt. 1 (1993), re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1661.  The Program directed the WB and other interna-
tional institutions to assess the social impacts of the projects that they fi-
nance. 
 205. SKOGLY, supra note 196, at 151. 
 206. Id. 
 207. McGoldrick argues that the principle of sustainable development has 
made some progress to the status of a legal principle.  Dominic McGoldrick, 
Sustainable Development and Human Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45 
INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 796, 802 (1996).  Other commentators argue that it has yet 
to become a norm of international law.  For an example of the soft law devel-
opments in the area, see Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and 
the Programme of Action of World Summit for Social Development, at Com-
mitment 2 § (h), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) (encouraging MDBs to sup-
port people-centered development). 
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encompass not only respect for the environment but also respect 
for human rights and community or popular participation.208 
With respect to asserting human rights obligations upon the 
World Bank, the difficult question lies in the determination of 
the content of the obligations, rather than the legal justifica-
tions.  Would the adoption of a human rights approach be 
merely an intellectual exercise or would it represent any actual 
improvement in the quality of oil projects?  Since the late 1980s, 
the Bank has adopted some human rights concepts, such as 
participation, without using human rights terminology.209  The 
Bank’s current approach to programming is not enough, how-
ever, because even if the Bank claims that the furtherance of 
economic and social rights is its raison d’être, its project prepa-
ration is not in fact based on a human rights approach.210 
As Skogly points out, the duty to respect imposes both sub-
stantial and procedural obligations.211  Substantive obligations 
in the context of project lending may include an evaluation of 
the human rights impacts on the populations concerned, an 
identification of specific human rights, a study of each individ-
ual right to determine which problems are likely to arise, and 
an amendment of policies in order to avoid a deteriorated hu-
man rights effect.212  Procedural obligations would consist of 
incorporating human rights considerations into different phases 
of a project: identification, preparation, appraisal, loan negotia-
tion, implementation, and evaluation.213  In fact, the adoption of 
a human rights approach would refine the substantive content 
of existing operational standards.  Procedures would also be 
modified so as to reduce management discretion in the decision-
making process. 
  
 208. McGoldrick, supra note 207, at 800.  The U.N. SG Agenda incorporates 
a vision of development as an integrated approach through five dimensions: 
peace as the foundation, economy as the engine of growth, environment as the 
basis of sustainability, justice as a pillar of society and democracy as good 
governance. 
 209. Patricia Armstrong, Human Rights and Non-State Actors, 11 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 205, 239 (1999). 
 210. Id. at 243. 
 211. SKOGLY, supra note 196, at 151. 
 212. Id. at 152. 
 213. Id. at 162.  See also Katarina Tomasevski, Human Rights Impact As-
sessment: Proposals for the Next 50 Years of Bretton Woods, in PROMOTING 
DEVELOPMENT: EFFECTIVE GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 82, 94 (Jo Marie Griesgrabber & Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1995). 
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As noted above, the operational standards do not provide 
comprehensive treatment of human rights issues.  A human 
rights approach would imply a change in the rationale of cer-
tain OD and OP provisions.  The World Bank does not currently 
treat human rights law the same way as it treats commercial 
law.214  As the following discussion will show, a modification of 
the “instrumental versus human rights approach” should cor-
rect the numerous insufficiencies existing within the procedural 
guarantees. 
Some of the human rights problems concern all of the IBRD, 
IFC, and MIGA policies, while others are specific to the private 
sector character of the IFC and MIGA.  It seems that, even in 
the event that the procedures are thoroughly respected, loop-
holes exist, which permit broad managerial discretion.  Many of 
the OPs refer to vague terms, such as “where appropriate.”215  
The World Bank endeavors not to finance projects that would 
cause severe environmental or natural resource deterioration, 
displace people, or unduly compromise public health and safety, 
without taking mitigating measures “acceptable to the Bank.”216 
This is the case of project classification for the environmental 
assessment purposes.  Even though the OP on Environmental 
Assessment establishes criteria for project classification, the 
final decision is left to management, which makes case-by-case 
determinations.217  This fact is significant because it may affect 
the human rights of the populations concerned.  As the more 
stringent consultation obligations depend on relatively discre-
tionary managerial decisions, the consultation process may be 
significantly reduced.  If the project is financed by the IBRD, no 
formal violation of the Bank’s Policies and Procedures would be 
found, and therefore it would not be possible to trigger the ju-
risdiction of the Inspection Panel.  If it is an IFC or MIGA loan 
project, the CAO may still accept the complaint, even without a 
formal violation, because the CAO Guidelines do not require a 
policy violation to have occurred for a complaint to be accepted; 
instead, it requires a much weaker basis. 
  
 214. Armstrong, supra note 209, at 246. 
 215. See, e.g., OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9, 12; OP 4.12: 
Involuntary Resettlement, ¶¶ 14, 18, 24. 
 216. KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
REVISITED 67–68 (1993). 
 217. IFC Project Categorization Examples, supra note 51. 
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Moreover, different World Bank institutions link different 
consultation requirements to each project category, which de-
tracts from clarity and legal certainty.  Category B projects, for 
example, have certain consultation requirements in IBRD and 
IDA loans.218  In IFC loans, however, consultation in Category B 
projects takes place “as appropriate.”219  The MIGA Environ-
mental Assessment Policy does not even require consultation 
for Category B projects.220  Therefore, mistakes committed in 
the early phases of a project may affect the final outcome.  In 
this respect, it is necessary to increase the role of monitoring 
bodies, such as the Inspection Panel or the CAO, to guarantee 
that stakeholders are properly involved and that environmental 
impacts are taken into account. 
With respect to human rights protection, more troublesome is 
the process through which the World Bank is transforming its 
early instruments, the ODs, into more modern standards: Op-
erational Policies, Bank Procedures, and Good Practices.  The 
transformation process is carried out as follows: the World 
Bank’s management prepares a draft and opens it to the civil 
society for comments;221 the Bank’s staff exercises discretion in 
deciding what comments it keeps or rejects;222 the final version 
is then circulated to the Board of Directors for approval.223 
Although this transformation may have the merit of increas-
ing clarity as to what is mandatory and what is not, the exces-
sive discretion of the Bank staff poses a number of risks.  First, 
as Benedict Kingsbury observes, the empowerment of the In-
spection Panel to examine projects by reference to the Bank’s 
Operational Policies and Procedures, but not to assess the ade-
quacy of those policies themselves, appears to provide some in-
centives to the management to try to attenuate the policies.224  
The drafters may, for example, put some of the former Opera-
tional Directive contents into Good Practices, which would then 
  
 218. World Bank OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment ¶¶ 15, 18. 
 219. IFC OP 4.01: Environmental Assessment ¶¶ 12, 14. 
 220. MIGA Environmental Assessment Policy, supra note 174, ¶¶ 9–12. 
 221. The World Bank, Policies, Policy Formulation and Review, at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,content/M
DK:20040574~menuPK:34574~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600,00.html#formulati
on (last visited Oct. 25, 2002). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 331. 
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become merely hortatory.  As a consequence, provisions guaran-
teeing respect for human rights would not be binding, and 
would therefore be placed out the Inspection Panel’s jurisdic-
tion. 
Second, the substantive content of environmental and social 
protections may also be watered down.  The wording of the for-
mer version of the Involuntary Resettlement Operational Direc-
tive seemed to indicate that the guarantees to be given to reset-
tling populations were a cost to the projects rather than a fun-
damental right.  Mentioning community involvement, it de-
clared “initial resistance to the idea of involuntary displacement 
is to be expected”225 and addressed consultation as a necessary 
problem rather than a fundamental right, it stated: “[t]o obtain 
co-operation, participation and feedback, the affected hosts and 
settlers need to be systematically informed and consulted dur-
ing preparation of the resettlement plan about their options and 
rights.”226  Although the current version uses a more politically 
correct language, it has substantially reduced the protections 
granted to project stakeholders, as the following examples dem-
onstrate. 
Whereas the former OD contained a presumption in favor of 
the recognition of rights to land even without formal legal title, 
(for example, customary rights), the current draft version only 
recognizes these rights if the local legislation acknowledges a 
claim to such rights.227  The current OP has also eliminated 
some of the strongest references to community involvement.  As 
another example, the former OD required plans to include a 
strategy for community participation,228 which was described as 
“critical.”229  It also established a presumption in favor of local 
NGO involvement, given their ability to foster participation.230  
  
 225. World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 8.  This is the former 
version of World Bank OP 4.12. 
 226. Id. (emphasis added). 
 227. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 15(a)–(b).  Section 
3(e) of the former World Bank OD included amongst the potential compensa-
tion recipients “[I]ndigenous groups, ethnic minorities, and pastoralists who 
may have usufruct or customary rights to the land or other resources taken 
for the project.  The absence of legal title to land by such groups should not be 
a bar to compensation.”  World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 8. 
 228. World Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement § 5. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
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It further stated that there should be certain institutionalized 
arrangements, such as regular meetings between officials and 
communities.231  The current version of OD, however, talks 
vaguely about participatory processes, which must be accept-
able to the Bank.232  The current version also deals with super-
vision and monitoring in less detail than in the past, giving 
Bank officials wider discretion in both procedural and substan-
tive issues.233 
As the World Bank standards are in some cases the only pro-
tections available to people affected by a project, this “watering-
down” of language may have serious consequences.  This risk 
could be avoided through a greater “judicialization” of the panel 
— by expanding its jurisdiction to include assessment of the 
substantive quality of the standards.  International human 
rights norms in the area that the relevant Guideline purports to 
safeguard should be the benchmarks against which the “consti-
tutionality” of the standards is assessed. 
The IFC and MIGA operational standards do not cover all the 
human rights issues likely to affect oil companies.  For example, 
as reported by international human rights NGOs, violent secu-
rity forces employed by oil companies are a major source of hu-
man rights violations.234  This may be a practical problem in the 
IFC-financed oil exploitations.  Recently, the IFC has granted a 
loan to Harken de Colombia Ltd., a subsidiary of the Texas-
  
 231. Id. 
 232. World Bank OP 4.12: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 7. 
 233. The former World Bank OD provided for supervision during implemen-
tation through Bank missions and annual reviews of large-scale resettlement.  
In-depth Bank reviews of midterm progress are also “highly desirable.”  World 
Bank OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement ¶ 31.  Finally, the project completion 
report submitted to the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) should 
evaluate resettlement and its impact on the standards of living of the reset-
tlers and the host population.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 234. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUDAN: THE HUMAN PRICE OF OIL ch. 
3 (Human Rights Violations Committed in the Name of Oil, 2000); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS V IOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES, ch. 5 (The En-
vironment) (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria 
/index.htm; Letter from José Miguél Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas 
Division, Human Rights Watch to E. John Browne, Group Chief Executive, 
British Petroleum Company Plc. (Apr. 17, 1998), at 
http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/corporations/colombia/Oilpat-01.htm [hereinaf-
ter Vivanco Letter]. 
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based Harken Energy Corp., to develop four oil fields in Colom-
bia for export.235  Prior to this granting, serious human rights 
violations issues arose in Columbia regarding the effect of pri-
vate security forces on oil exploration.236  Therefore, an IFC-
financed investment may need to address this question at some 
point.  However, how to make project sponsors abide by their 
own policies within the security area is still an issue for further 
study.  The development of voluntary auditing practices by the 
primary oil companies may be a promising first step.  If audit-
ing and reporting become standard practice in the industry, 
there would be some grounds upon which to incorporate repre-
sentations and warranties into project finance.  In the financial 
field, it is customary to include representations of the type: “the 
annual accounts, as audited, reflect accurately the situation of 
the company.”  If human rights considerations, including pri-
vate security, become a subject of public relations for corpora-
tions, it would be easier to create contractual conditions neces-
sary to instil human rights protections. 
Some other problems linked to business development may 
also have an impact on human rights.  In certain projects, the 
IFC and the MIGA are minority shareholders and have less lev-
erage than they otherwise might have.237  On many occasions, 
the two agencies are called to finance projects that have already 
started.  In such situations, the agencies must verify that the 
environmental and social assessments undertaken by the pro-
ject sponsors conform to IFC/MIGA policies.238  In addition, the 
reinforcement of independent monitoring bodies is critical, in 
order to guarantee that the review be genuine rather than a 
mere formality. 
  
 235. Press Release, IFC, IFC Finances Development of Oilfields in Colombia 
(Sept. 1, 1999), at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ifcext/pressroom/ 
ifcpressroom.nsf. 
 236. British Petroleum became the target of NGO criticism when it was 
accused of employing paramilitary forces to protect its investment in Colom-
bia.  See Amnesty International, Colombia: British Petroleum Risks Fuelling 
Human Rights Crisis through Military Training, (June 30, 1997), at 
http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/AMR23044199/?OpenDocument.  See also 
Vivanco Letter, supra note 234. 
 237. CAO Guidelines, supra note 189 (Introduction). 
 238. IFC OP 4.01, supra note 158, at ¶ 13.  IFC Safeguard Policies, supra 
note 37. 
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Prepayment of loans by project sponsors is another business 
issue that has arisen in practice.  In that event, the IFC or the 
MIGA exit from the project, thereby releasing the borrower 
from its environmental and social commitments.  For example, 
this happened with the lending package granted by the IFC to 
the U.S. company BASIC for oil extraction in Guatemala.239  In 
cases where the loans are prepaid, it would be necessary to in-
clude contractual clauses requiring borrowers to report even 
after loan repayment, and to include guarantees (for example, 
penalty payments) to ensure their continuing compliance with 
environmental and social standards. 
Finally, although the IFC and MIGA policies can be rein-
forced, some greater issues may prevent these institutions from 
adopting a serious monitoring role.  First, there may be a con-
tradiction between their roles as investors and development 
agencies.  As Bergesen and Lunde point out, the World Bank 
raises its money in the capital markets, where the dominant 
criteria for lending is a project’s rate of return, calculated by 
conventional financial input/output analysis.240  Despite this, 
the World Bank institutions’ roles as development agencies and 
their anti-poverty strategies require a priority for the poorest 
countries and populations.241 
Secondly, conflicts of interests may also exist, between the 
IFC’s role as a profit-making investor and that of an adviser, 
especially where some IFC departments have merged with 
those in the World Bank.  As a result, the same group of people 
may be advising governments on privatization and deregulation 
strategies,242 while discussing private sector investment plans 
and taking stakes in the same sector. 
  
 239. BASIC prepaid its loan in 1999.  MARTONE, supra note 161, at 1. 
 240. The Bank attained its prestige on Wall Street by being a very conser-
vative lender (it concentrated its loans especially in infrastructure), and thus 
gained the AAA status that permitted it to borrow at the best possible condi-
tions. BERGESEN AND LUNDE, supra note 2, at 109. 
 241. The Bank’s lending in the social sector never exceeded 6%, although 
the Bank itself acknowledged that the long-term rate of return of social in-
vestment is high.  Tomasevski, supra note 216.  While IFC has operations in 
129 countries, it has been criticised for concentrating a large part of its activi-
ties in countries that can attract other private sector lenders by themselves, 
such as Brazil and Russia.  See IFC AND MIGA  TOOLKIT, supra note 134, at 1. 
 242. The IBRD and the IFC operate jointly the Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service (“FIAS”).  The FIAS helps developing and transition countries design 
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Third, there is another potential contradiction — which was 
very visible in the Chad/Cameroon Project — between the 
World Bank’s watchdog responsibilities and its lending role.  On 
some occasions, an unyielding application of the standards may 
lead to the abandonment of a commercial operation, yet, as an 
active lender, the World Bank Group must finance projects for 
its very institutional survival.  A good example of this contra-
diction would be the involvement of the IFC in a lending project 
to develop an oilfield affecting an indigenous community.  The 
indigenous community, apart from not being an oil consumer, 
would not be keen on modifying its traditional modus vivendi.  
As an investor, the IFC would be interested in a quick and ef-
fective project cycle, and, as a lender, would also wish to further 
its clients’ interests.  However, the IFC has acknowledged that 
its clients are unhappy with its bureaucracy and slow project 
approval process.243  This illustrates that the enlargement of the 
World Bank’s role as a standard setter must be accompanied by 
the development of independent monitoring mechanisms with 
mandatory, (as opposed to merely hortatory), powers that actu-
ally guarantee a reliable application of those standards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Discussion of human rights is occupying many new fields.  
From the NGO forum, to scholarly writings, and international 
organizations, human rights have now jumped to boards of di-
rectors and stock exchange quotations.  These developments 
prove that the human rights discourse is being mainstreamed 
into new areas.  Earlier, human rights were the province of phi-
losophy and the law, prominent in political theory, and in con-
stitutional jurisprudence.  Following the Second World War, 
human rights have become a matter of international law and 
international relations.244  Now, they also seem to be entering 
  
initiatives to attract foreign direct investment.  See FIAS, at 
http://www.fias.net (last visited, Jan. 25, 2002). 
 243. IFC AND MIGA  TOOLKIT , supra note 134, at 6.  Nevertheless, the fact is 
that the IFC is a transaction oriented agency, whereas the Bank is more stra-
tegic and policy oriented.  Whereas the average project cycle is only five to 
seven months at the IFC, it is eighteen to twenty-four months at the Bank.  
See MICHELLE MILLER-ADAMS, THE WORLD BANK: NEW AGENDAS IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 59, 112 (1999). 
 244. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13 (1990). 
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the province of business.  Paraphrasing Louis Henkin, corpora-
tions “today do not feel free to preach what they may persist in 
practicing.”245 
Over the decades, the World Bank has extended its field of 
activities from mere project finance to cover economic and insti-
tutional reforms.246  As a result of this mission creep, the World 
Bank is now undergoing an identity crisis, because it is obliged 
to face conflicting goals.247  The clarification and systematiza-
tion of these issues is outside the scope of this Article.  How-
ever, the need to address an overall reform of international fi-
nancial institutions is not an obstacle to the reinforcement and 
rule-based application of their own operational policies through 
the execution of the World Bank’s investments. 
The World Bank’s operational standards, even if they do not 
use a human rights language, introduce basic human rights 
protections, such as consultation with affected populations.  In 
some cases, the application of these “soft law” rules may be the 
only guarantee for affected populations.  The World Bank may 
also act as a trendsetter, with regard to both public and private 
entities.  These entities might eventually endorse, rather than 
reject, the operational standards, and might even apply them to 
projects not involving the Bank.248  Moreover, the World Bank 
has developed non-judicial procedures that may, on some occa-
sions, be the only discussion forum provided to the affected 
populations.  In this respect, the World Bank’s policies could 
potentially become an incipient international administrative 
law, which would establish uniform benchmarks of protection in 
the development of natural resources.249  Given the confusion 
  
 245. Id. at x.  According to Professor Henkin, “governments today do not feel 
free to preach what they may persist in practicing.”  Id. at x (emphasis added). 
 246. John Toye, Structural Adjustment: Context, Assumptions, Origin and 
Diversity, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND BEYOND IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
RESEARCH AND POLICY ISSUES 19, 29 (Rolph van der Hoeven & Fred van der 
Kraaij eds., 1994).  See generally MILLER-ADAMS, supra note 243, at 73, 112; 
Cahn, supra note 18; DASGUPTA, supra note 18. 
 247. For a recent analysis of the Bank’s dilemmas, see Christopher L. Gil-
bert and David Vines, The World Bank: An Overview of Some Major Issues, in 
THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURES AND POLICIES 10–32 (C. Gilbert & D. Vines 
eds., 2000). 
 248. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 339. 
 249. Id. at 323. 
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currently reigning in the petroleum sector, a trendsetter is in-
deed necessary. 
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While this article was being prepared for publication, the 
World Bank Inspection Panel issued its Investigation Report on 
the Chad Cameroon Project.250  Although the Panel praises the 
Bank’s efforts to apply its policies in a challenging environment 
and to build a strong external monitoring capacity,251 it also 
finds that the Project is in breach with a number of World Bank 
Operational Policies to the extent that the Project could jeop-
ardize its ultimate poverty reduction objective.  The Panel first 
points out several breaches of World Bank OP 4.01 (Environ-
mental Assessment) with respect to the definition of the region 
area and the assessment of the Project’s environmental effects 
at the regional level.  The Report further identifies a series of 
the Project’s deficiencies with the capacity building and eco-
nomic management.252  The Panel observes that due to the Pro-
ject’s lack of a more thorough appraisal of its sustainability and 
risks, the Project fails to comply with World Bank OP 10.04 
(Economic Evaluation on Investment Operations).  The Panel 
expresses its worry over the fact that while the oil field and 
pipeline construction are operating ahead of schedule, the ca-
pacity building measures are falling behind.253 
Although the World Bank does not have specific operational 
policies on good governance and human rights, the group of 
people who filed the request for inspection at the Panel argued 
that the Project violated the Bank’s policies in this respect.254  
  
 250. See Press Release, World Bank Board of Directors Approves Manage-
ment’s Response to Inspection Panel Report on Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Pro-
ject (Sept. 12, 2002), at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/news/index.htm.  
For the full text of the Report, see Chad Inspection Panel Investigation Re-
port, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); 
Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373-
CD); and Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD) (Sept. 
17, 2002), at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/chad_Investigation 
_repor_final.pdf [hereinafter Inspection Panel Report].   
 251. Inspection Panel Report, supra note 250 ¶¶ 82, 308. 
 252. See id. ¶¶ 24–83.  For a summary of the Bank’s concerns in this re-
spect, see Executive Summary of the Inspection Panel Report. 
 253. See id ¶¶ 218–265, 286–293. 
 254. Id. ¶ 210.   
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In spite of the controversial role of promoting human rights 
within the Bank’s mandate, the Panel argues that it “felt 
obliged to examine” whether these issues may prevent the im-
plementation of the project in a manner compatible with the 
Bank’s policies.255  After considering the troublesome human 
rights panorama in Chad, the Panel affirms that “the situation 
is far from ideal,” and raised questions about the Project’s com-
pliance with the Bank’s policies.256  In the Panel’s opinion, this 
problematic human rights situation will require reinforced 
monitoring by the Bank.257 
 
  
 255. Id. ¶ 215. 
 256. Id. at 61 (“Box 3”), ¶¶ 216–17. 
 257. Id. ¶ 217. 
